Arminius the Cheruskan
His Name and its Derivation
Arminius’ Youth
The Roman Officer
The Commander of Auxiliaries
Arminius’ Personal Characteristics
Changing Sides
The Strategy for Liberation
The Conspiracy
The Battle Plan
On the Eve of Battle
In German lands, Arminius is better known by the name of “Hermann.” In Old Germanic he would have been called Charimannus. The two names have nothing to do with each other, however. Arminius is a Latin name that has long puzzled scholars, and it is possible that our hero’s name was originally Erman or Armin.
An etymological explanation might show that it is derived from the Germanic names erman / ermin / armin meaning “big” or “exalted,” as in the names of Ermanerich (king of the Goths) and Ermanfried (king of the Thuringians.)
The same etymology applies to Irmin in “Irmin-Sul” or the female names “Irmingard” / “Irmgard.” Among the Saxons of the 10th Century, the name Irmin still implied something outstanding or significant.
If Arminius’ name was originally “Erman” or “Armin,” the Romans, could have adapted his name to their language by changing “E” to “A” and adding the Latin ending “ius,” at the time they knighted him. Another example of this was their changing the Latin name of the Gothic king Ermanaricus to Arminaricus. It is also possible that his being accepted into the Roman nobility (which was called “Gens Arminia”) might have had something to do with the origins of Arminius’ name. This is not very likely, however.
It is more likely that his name corresponded to his clan, and that it clearly identified him as belonging to it. His father was named Sigimer; his father-in-law Segestes; Segestes’ son Sigimund; Segestes’ brother Segimer; and Segestes’ nephew Segithank. According to this the prominent prefix “Sig” or “Seg” could have been the common name of the entire family, namely the clan of the “Sigs.” It is feasible that Sigimer’s eldest son and Arminius’s younger brother, whom the Romans called Flavus (“the blonde”), likewise had “Sig” as part of his name. He might have been called “Sigmund,” “Sigmar,” “Siogfried” or “Sigurd” before he entered the Roman army.
Arminius was a Cheruskan. The Gau (district) that his father oversaw as Gaugraf (earl) was roughly bordered by the Ems, Weser, Diemel, Aller, Leine and Oker extending to the Harz. The heart of his holdings was the area of Minden/Ravensberg, Teutoburg Forest, Lippe with the Weser foothills and the Paderborn Plateau.
An ancient road, the so-called Hellweg, led through this region. It lead from the Rhine by way of today’s Osnabrück to the Weser ford at Minden, then past the Weser and Bücke mountains, past Stadthagen, Elze and Hildesheim all the way to the Elbe at Magdeburg.
The Hellweg was one of the most important east-west routes in northern Germany during prehistoric times, during classical antiquity and the Middle Ages. It continued to be a military road well into the 18th Century.
Even today, numerous bordering fortifications still attest to its former significance.
The Cheruskans, who lived mostly in the present-day Lower Saxony and Lippe regions in the western part of northwestern Germany, probably got their name from the proto Germanic word Hiruz or Hirusk (“Stag.”) Thus their country would have been called something akin to “Land of the stag-men” or “Stagland.” The Romans nearly always took over the existing indigenous names for tribes, rivers, mountain ranges, etc. and then Latinized them somewhat. Thus they might have come upon “Hirusk” or “Herusk” by asking “What is your name?” If the “H” was pronounced like “ch” or “k,” as in the archaic German word “Sashnot” (modern “Schwertgenoß”) they might have arrived at “Cheruski.”
The Romans had been attempting to establish themselves in the Germanic territories since the year 16 BC. In the course of this attempt the imperial princes Drusus and Tiberius had penetrated deep into the interior of Germania. They had fought with several Germanic tribes including the Cheruskans (first in the year 11 BC.)
After a “great war” broke out (probably a revolt in the area east of the Rhine) in the year 2 BC, the Romans decided to forcibly “resettle” the Cheruskans. The attempt was unsuccessful, presumably because of the Cheruskans’ resistance. Caesar had successfully applied the practice of “resettlement” to unruly peoples: tens of thousands of tribesmen would suddenly be driven from their homeland and transplanted to distant regions of the Empire. Probably the supreme military commander in Germania, Ahenobarbus, or else his successor M. Vinicius, demanded that the Cheruskan duke Sigimer turn over hostages in order to force him into compliance. This was usually the first step toward formal dominance by Rome. It was customary to secure several persons of the highest possible birth or rank, in order to create an effective means of coercion. They were placed in Roman society commensurate with their social ranking, and they often succumbed to the influence of Rome. It was very much in the spirit of Roman foreign policy to subsequently use such persons as pro-Roman chess pieces who would toe the Roman line.
Young Arminius, who was about 15 at the time* (he had been born between 18 and 16 BC), could have been brought to Rome along with his brother (whom the Romans later named “Flavus” because of his blonde hair) as living pawns, to grow up there and be raised as Romans. The Cheruskan prince Sigimer finally gave in to superior Roman power and submitted to Tiberius in the year 4 AD. As part of the subordination agreement, Sigimer was rewarded with Roman citizenship for himself and all his family.
*Footnote: Arminius was born in 18 or 16 B.C.
After that time, the Cheruskans were required to furnish a contingent of auxiliary troops for the Roman army. It was the same policy that Napoleon I applied to the favored princes of the Rhine Confederation The supplying of indigenous troop contingents and delivery of all sorts of supplies was connected with the title of a duke or prince.
The kinship of Gaufürst Sigimer was one of the most influential in the land of the Cheruskans. Sigimer’s brother Ingomer, as well as a distantly related Gaugraf named Segestes (who sent his son Segimund as a priest to Cologne) also received the title of “Amicus Populi Romanorum” (“Friend of the Roman People.”) Such sweet-sounding titles and distinctions cost the Romans nothing and bound their bearers all the more closely to Rome.
According to tried-and-true colonialist diplomacy and the tactic of “divide et impera” (divide and rule), Rome first attempted to win over the more educated Germanic ruling elite and their sympathizers and integrate them socially, since Roman culture and civilization exerted very great influence in the world. The indigenous leadership was expected to assist this process of re-education by gradually introducing their peoples to Roman thought and culture. The Romans kept the tribal princes and their sons under considerable pressure and they enticed them with lucrative career opportunities as leaders of troop contingents in the Roman army. The Roman legions were actually quite similar to a foreign legion. The Romans were not stingy with distributions of Roman titles of nobility or with privileges or expensive gifts. They also presented dazzling weaponry to the men and costly jewelry and housewares for the women. The Romans expected that the Germanic nobles in their service would provide them with helpful information about their lands and people. The Romans were particularly interested in gathering the most exact geographical information possible about the areas lying farther to the east.
We can only speculate as to whether the brothers spent their adolescence in Italy, or their entire childhood. If they entered Roman military service only after conclusion of the treaty in the year 4 AD, Arminius would have become commander of an auxiliary contingent at age 21. In that case he would have had only 3 years of frontline duty under Tiberius when he retuned from the Balkans to his homeland.
It seems doubtful that such a short period would have sufficed to achieve such high rank within the Roman nobility, especially for a German. The same is true of his detailed knowledge of Roman military practice. For this reason we can assume that both brothers were sent to Italy in early childhood and raised to be soldiers, as was customary for the education of Roman military officers.
The question as to whether the sons of Sigimer entered Roman military service in adolescence or early childhood must remain open. We do know for certain that both, as sons of Germanic nobility, were granted Roman citizenship and appointed commanders of Germanic cavalry squadrons, which means that they enjoyed particular high prestige among Roman commanders.
Arminius returned to the Cheruskan lands before the ending of hostilities, but Flavus, who was apparently the younger of the two, remained with the army, which he never left.
Gaius Velleius Paterculus, a commander of cavalry and war correspondent for Tiberius for over nine years, informs us that Arminius “... was a constant participant in all our earlier campaigns.”
According to this informant, both Arminius and Flavus would have been engaged in campaigns against several West Germanic and East Germanic tribes as well as campaigns in the Danubian region in addition to Hungary and the Balkans since the beginning of the Pannonic-Illyrian War in the Year 6. And if Arminius served on the Tiberius’ staff, the two cavalry officers were most certainly war comrades. At any rate the Roman reporter has given us a very lifelike picture of Arminius’ character, a description that could have been written only by someone who was observing him very closely. Velleius itemizes everything that he, as a Roman officer, found to be significant and particularly remarkable “for a barbarian.” He mentions Arminius’ extreme bravery, quick comprehension and equally quick decisiveness. Velleius makes his personal charisma visible to us when he writes that Arminius’ face and especially his eyes “display the fire within his spirit.” What else might we surmise about his appearance? He must have shared the typical appearance of Nordic men that Roman sculptors so often depicted as the general type on their columns in full or partial relief: tall and athletically slender with noble and masculine facial features. Probably he, like his brother Flavus, had blonde or reddish hair and the for the Roman Tacitus so remarkable “defiant expression from blue eyes.”
As a highly talented soldier and officer, Arminius became thoroughly familiar with the high art of Roman strategy and tactics while serving under Tiberius. Apparently he had exceptional understanding and aptitude for tactical and strategic co-ordination combined with an outstanding capacity for thinking logically. In a very short time he absorbed all that he needed to know about the Roman practice of waging war. During his career as a Roman officer he had been honored by the highly unusual distinction of being elevated into the Roman nobility, which he earned by his outstanding bravery and famous successes in frontline fighting. Arminius had moved up the military ladder to achieve a social position comparable to that of a senator in the civilian sector, which automatically included ranking in nobility. He was also given a golden ring as an emblem of extreme distinction.
Arminius returned to his homeland in the year 7, at around 24 years of age. In the same year, Quinctilius Varus assumed the rule over Germania. The war in Pannonia, which had begun in the year 6, had not yet ended, so that Tiberius was occupied there for three more years.
Just why did Arminius return? There could be several reasons for this. Since there is no more mention of his father Sigimer in Roman reports of this date, he could have died. In view of increasing anti-Roman sentiment in Cheruskia it is also possible that his father was assassinated by an enemy of Rome who considered him a traitor, since he was a nobleman allied with Rome. At any rate Arminius, as eldest son, would have to assume his inheritance. This would have been a plausible reason to return, and totally in compliance with Roman policy: a highly decorated Roman officer who commanded a force of Germanic auxiliaries, a reliable friend of Rome would now be the leader of the Cheruskans, who had not yet been completely Romanized. It seemed an ideal solution to the growing unrest.
It is equally likely that Tiberius ordered the transfer of Arminius, whom he knew well as a particularly well-qualified liaison officer, to the staff of his friend Quinctilius Varus. Tiberius would have wanted to make a battle-tested young officer available to the paper-pushing desk general who had no talent for leading troops and for whom Germania was entirely new. Arminius spoke fluent Latin and was intimately familiar with the conditions in the land.
It is possible that a wound he had received in Pannonia provided additional incentive for Arminius’ return home, in conjunction with the transfer to Varus’ staff.
Tiberius and Arminius’ father were well acquainted, since they had negotiated and completed the Roman-Cheruskan alliance in the year 4. This personal relationship could very well have contributed to Arminius’ being chosen for a key post that was extremely influential both politically and militarily, in the highest circles of Roman authority in Germania.
Arminius was now married. It is not known how long he had been married. Some time after the year 7, when he returned to the homeland, he apparently met and fell in love with Thusnelda. She was the daughter of Segestes, who was an earl like Arminius’ father. Against the will of her father, who intended to marry her off to a man of his choosing, Arminius abducted her with her consent and made her his wife. It was quite customary among Germanic tribesmen to abduct one’s bride, and not considered dishonorable. Thusnelda was probably around 16 or 17 at that time, and Arminius around 24.
We can be certain that Arminius led an auxiliary contingent under Varus as well. His social position qualified him to command a mounted troop, perhaps a so-called Ala with around 500 riders. He could also have served as prefect of a cohors equitata as prefect. This was a mixed unit that consisted of three quarters foot and one quarter mounted troops, for a total of 500 to 800 men. A Roman commanding officer would not have trusted any Germanic leader with much more than this, even with high Roman titles and distinctions.
The auxiliary Germanic cavalry had a very good reputation among the Romans. After all, it had played a decisive role in the Roman victory over the Gallic prince Versingetorix in the year 52 BC, as a result of which all of Gaul became a Roman province. For this reason, Roman high command normally left such units alone under the command of their indigenous leaders. The Roman army commanders usually tolerated local peculiarities and unconventional practices of the Germanic auxiliaries, as for example their style of leadership, loyalty to leader social status order and religious connotations. The only important thing of importance to the Romans was success in military actions. Auxiliary troops were supposed to spare Roman blood, and nothing else mattered.
In such a society of “born warriors,” strong esprit de corps must have developed from the feelings of pride in belonging to an elite and famous unit. They may have ultimately been under Roman command, but they were led by their own tribal chieftains. They were perhaps comparable to the kepis blancs of the French Foreign Legion.
Auxiliaries serving under the Roman eagles were obligated to serve Rome by the treaties or contracts of their respective chieftains. It could only be to Rome’s advantage that Germans were often pitted against Germans. Obviously this seldom kept the participating mercenaries -- mercenaries in the truest sense of that word -- from fighting other warriors of the same origins, language and religion when they were ordered to do so by their superiors. With incredible pigheadedness, the Germanic tribesmen and their descendants have continued until quite modern times to routinely slaughter each other under the militaristic dogma that “orders are orders:” as Lord Tennyson so exquisitely expressed it, “...theirs not to reason why, theirs but to do and die”.
Footnote: *These wars between brothers continued until quite recent times, as for example the Seven Years War, the Napoleonic Wars and the so-called Wars of Unification
of 1864 and 1866.
These auxiliary military units were originally supposed to be deployed only along the borders of their own territories, as a kind of home militia. It was their primary mission to protect their territories, under Roman supervision, as well as escort supply columns and guard strategic locations such as river crossings. They were also responsible for protecting and maintaining the fortresses, roads, post stations and grain depots, and well as other tasks. In effect, they were overseeing their own native borders, although exclusively in the interest of Rome.
Gradually these units came to be deployed outside their home territories, for combat in distant lands of the huge empire. Their mission increasingly became to relieve the Italian legions and replace their bloody losses.
At the height of its power, the Empire possessed as many auxiliary contingents as Italian legions.
The great mass of auxiliaries were composed of infantry units, raised from the conquered tribes. We can only speculate about the “morale” of these conscripts. Their morale was probably similar to that of 18th Century “unreliable cantonists” who were conscripted to bear muskets. This does not exclude the possibility that some of them were reconciled to their fate, however. Others even found satisfaction in a warlike existence which, like weapons production, occupied a significant and respected position among the Germans.
Among Roman commanders, Germanic auxiliaries were considered to be especially reliable. The oath of loyalty that they swore certainly implied a much stronger obligation for them than for the Oriental or Balkan auxiliaries. Among Roman and subsequently among Byzantine emperors, Germanic bodyguards enjoyed an equally high regard.
Like the Roman legions, the auxiliary forces were divided into cohorts of 500 to 1000 men, but they were less well armed and equipped. The auxiliaries normally fought wearing nothing except trousers and sandals, their upper bodies naked, as was their custom, They were usually armed with sword, cudgel or battle axe. Some auxiliary tribes served only as cavalry, archers or sling hurlers. They nearly always formed the first wave of attack at the beginning of a battle, or else they were deployed as skirmishers in front of the closed ranks of legionaires in battle formation, in order to save Roman blood for the main battle. Many centuries later it was customary for the imperialist powers to have colonialist peoples shed their blood on their behalf. Thus it is easy to understand that these troops saw themselves as soldiers of lesser value, as “expendable.” They were expected to make the greatest sacrifices and they were also paid less. Both of these circumstances had negative influence on morale, and consequently they tended to mutiny, if for example they were not paid on time. Mutinies occurred quite frequently, even in the regular army. For the same reasons, turncoats and deserters came mostly from the ranks of the auxiliaries.
For obvious reasons, the relationship between the regular legions and the auxiliaries was a strained one. These tensions and contradictions did not disappear until much later, when the Roman armies between Rhine and Donau consisted almost entirely of Germanic tribesmen.
At the time of his arrival, the auxiliary unit that Arminius commanded under Varus probably consisted of a simple “home militia” force. After taking command, he reorganized and trained it according to his own wishes and experiences, including a corps of junior officers. Through his authority, family origins, inherent ability and leadership charisma, he soon succeeded in turning a group of peasant warriors into a core unit of outstanding strength and morale. Not surprisingly, the unit was intensely loyal to him personally. The fact that all this could take place under the eyes of the Roman military administration greatly benefited both him and his purpose.
Arminius’ Personal Characteristics
Although the information about Arminius’ inner nature that has passed down to us is incomplete, it is still possible to reconstruct his character and personality on the basis of transmitted written records. We have to investigate his inner life, his thoughts and aspirations by investigating his actions, for which there is abundant research material. These actions provide a measure of the expansive nature and extent of his unique personality. With a little imagination accompanied by logical conclusions, we can recreate many of his feelings as well as the main ideas that motivated him.
In pursuing such a method of investigation, however, we have to keep in mind that Roman historiography recorded primarily what appeared important, significant or noteworthy to them. We have to consider also that ancient authors and historians tended to consider these events in a subjective light; and furthermore, as servants of the Roman state, they were limited to a loyal depiction of events that concerned Rome. All in all they saw in Arminius an opponent whom they had to take very seriously -- in fact, a freedom fighter who deserved their highest respect. The mere fact that a “barbarian,” which to the Romans meant someone who was primitive and half civilized, would dare attack the Imperium Romanum, the greatest political and military power of the world; and that they could not defeat this barbarian despite their mightiest efforts, demanded both their amazement and undisguised admiration.
It is of course primarily the warlike Arminius who emerges from these accounts, but along with him we see the brilliant field marshal and tactician as well as the politician and statesman. His manner of speaking, the power of his arguments, the kindling fire with which he was able to ignite and inspire the men of his army, still resonate from the speeches that Tacitus has handed down to us. In these speeches the very person of Arminius stands lifelike before our eyes, and we are able to behold a part of his passionate and warlike nature.
This Cheruskan thought and perceived many things differently from most fellows of his class. He obviously was capable of seeing far ahead at a very early age. He recognized political connections of which other tribal leaders were unaware and he anticipated possibilities that they could not foresee because of their lack of knowledge and experience.
Because of his education in Italy, perhaps he felt in his heart and underneath his Roman armor more like a German than just a Cheruskan. Apparently he felt a very close and strong relationship, even love for his people, divided into so many tribes but having a similar language and sharing the same blood and same beliefs. This feeling was so strong that he was prepared to champion their cause with all his strength without regard for himself, come what may!
Where Germanic sympathies and feelings of patriotism were concerned, Arminius was very different from his brother Flavus, who was also Germanic, an officer in the Roman army. Flavus had already made his decision, and he saw the future of Germania as unconditional capitulation to Roman power and Roman culture.
Arminius completely disagreed with this. For him the only conceivable future lay in the independent development of a free Germanic nation, and he refused to compromise on this. This conviction became a sacred obligation for Arminius, as is clear from the highly dramatic conversation that he and his brother Flavus had on the eve of battle from opposite banks of the Weser. That conversation has been handed down to us in great detail.
The Romans did not hesitate to / ascribe high intelligence to Arminius. The Romans did not spare him reproaches of craftiness and deceit to the point of treason, but their criticism was aimed mostly at the “stupid bonehead” Varus, who allowed himself to be so outlandishly tricked.
To deceive the enemy whenever and wherever possible, to lure him into a trap and then deal him a devastating blow was obviously part of his operating procedure. It was not really typical of his nature and character, however; rather, it characterized his cool-headed and reality-oriented intelligence. His basic governing principle was always first and foremost to fend off the enemy who was threatening the life and liberty of his people.
Everything he did was subordinated to this mission. That is not to say that any and every means was acceptable to him. Only those means were acceptable that were designed to fend off an immediate and certain threat. His efforts did not go beyond this. He did not strive for dominance and repression like his enemy, nor did he strive for wealth and fame. He did not resettle other tribes or nations, nor did he murder defenseless persons, nor did he trample on the freedom of others, nor did he destroy the culture of others. He was filled with deep and abiding hatred of everything that threatened the life and liberty of his people, but his hate ended where the threats ended. His watchfulness and concern never ended, however.
Arminius was proud. He reacted violently to personal insults. He was also inclined to passionate anger and ridicule. His self-confidence was obviously very pronounced, otherwise he would not have attempted to attack the legions of Varus and Germanicus.
He was also possessed of an unbending will and iron steadfastness that never left him, even in the most critical situations.
In the course of frequent and difficult negotiations with hasty or irresolute allies, who had little or no interest in his wide-ranging ideas, he needed great steadfastness and perseverance, as well as the ability to make his visions comprehensible to simple minds. All these character traits of Arminius can be clearly read from his actions and pronouncements as set down and preserved by actual writers of history.
He must have loved his wife Thusnelda very much. We know that he abducted and married her against the will of her father Segestes. Segestes never forgave the abduction and persecuted his daughter and her husband with relentless hatred. When his pregnant wife was delivered into the hands of his deadly enemy Germanicus through the treachery of her father, Arminius was overcome with grief and anger. He grew more resolute than ever in his opposition to Rome and its German agents and collaborators. After Thusnelda’s capture, he directed a flaming appeal to his countrymen that demonstrated and laid bare the great depths of his spirit.
All in all, Arminius must have been an unusually proud and fearless, self-confident, strong-willed and level-headed leader. With this was combined a captivating charisma, great strategic perception and unusual capacity for intuition. His visionary and diplomatic spirit was indeed unique in his age.
For many years researchers have puzzled over the recurring enigma of Arminius as reflected in the writings of ancient historians. What could have moved or provoked the young Cheruskan prince with the Roman upbringing and promising military career in the Roman army to commit the seemingly insane act of attacking the world superpower -- and with vastly inferior forces, at a time when Rome was at the zenith of its power and splendor?
On the basis of ancient accounts researchers generally point out that he acted out of love for his homeland and liberty for his people, after the vicious Roman governor Publius Quinctilius Varus had intensified tyranny and exploitation to an intolerable extent.
But is this really an adequate explanation? Was this really the only reason that caused Arminius to change sides?
Were two years of rule by Governor Varus enough to bring about such a change of heart and to turn Arminius into a deadly enemy of Rome?
Was it really just the excessive demands for tribute and the inhuman methods with which Varus proceeded (under the hypocritical slogan of Jus et Ordo (Juctice and Order) that caused Arminius to break with Rome?
Or were there other, heavier and more persuasive reasons --perhaps concerning strongly held convictions -- that had long been developing in his heart of hearts? Could it be that Varus simply overstepped the boundary that had heretofore kept Arminius from making the decisive break?
On the other hand, did he not have to overcome hesitations before taking this last step? After all, he must have known that failure in such a desperate undertaking would inevitably lead to slavery or death -- not only for himself but for everyone involved, and for all his people! Could he possibly take such a great responsibility upon himself? How could he be so sure of his decision?
Above all we have to assume that Arminius had scruples about betraying Varus and violating his oath and obligation to remain a true and loyal subject of Rome. Loyalty was the uppermost virtue in Germanic culture. At least, it appeared so to the Romans. When the Romans spoke of a treaty violation, this was correct from their point of view. From the Germanic point of view, placing highest regard on life and liberty of their own people, this was not necessarily the case. The Germanic tribesmen did not feel bound by alliances with a state, since “state” was an abstract conception for them. They were bound only by personal obligations. Thus, alliances with other tribes were always formed by and limited to alliances between their chiefs. Thus Arminius might have felt obligated to Tiberius, but not to the Roman Empire and its governor Varus. We do not know whether he ever swore an oath of service to him; perhaps he was never required to swear such an oath. If he had been required to swear such an oath, how could he deceive Varus for years and then destroy him? Was not Arminius violating his code of honor, and were not honor and loyalty the highest virtues of a Germanic warrior? Would not such a violation result in societal obloquy and eternal damnation?
On the other hand, Varus had long ago violated his oath and broken his word of honor. He had not proven to be a friend of the Germans, but rather their vicious enemy. He had clearly betrayed Arminius and his people. How long should a German feel obligated to be bound to such an alliance? Could a man of honor do otherwise than take action and turn against such a traitor, the enemy of his people?
Arminius must have recognized the Roman Empire’s greatest evil years before his break with it. The Empire was above all a slave state. Because of the massive military expansion of the Empire, Roman citizens (especially peasants) would be torn from their native soil for years to serve as soldiers on the far flung fronts of the world of those days. For this reason they were compelled to rely ever more on slaves to do the necessary work in agriculture, mines and other industries.
Footnote: It goes without saying that the fate of Roman slaves was drudgery and misery, and worst of all was the fate of mineworkers and construction workers. They were fed the extreme minimum to keep them alive, and their condition lasted until age or disease rendered them unfit to work. Then they were turned out to starve.
In order to nourish the population, wealthy Romans and speculators bought up the fields of smallholding peasants at low prices and created huge plantations called latifundias, which they operated cheaply with slave labor. Finally the owners of these latifundias became so wealthy and powerful that they were able to dictate the price of grain, which made them still more wealthy and powerful.
This development of course had a particularly devastating effect on the peasantry, which was now landless and unemployed. As refugees from the countryside they immigrated to the large cities where they and other marooned classes formed a sort of mass urban proletariat, the plebs, who then demanded panem et circenses (bread and games.) In those days Rome already had a population of around 700,000. In order to placate the plebs, the Roman state had to spend vast funds to feed and entertain them. The alternatives were rioting and civil wars.
The imperialistic economic system required simultaneously a growing food supply and increasing exploitation of natural resources and slave labor, which led to increasing demand for slaves. Rome’s perpetual wars of conquest produced hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war, who were then sold like cattle to slave dealers. The slave dealers in turn bartered the wretched prisoners to the nouveau riche Romans, who were obsessed with the craving for ever greater pleasures and luxuries. Because of the cheap slave labor the ruling classes were able to double their profits, further increasing Rome’s unsurpassed trade in human wretchedness.
Those miserable slaves, who were used to deprive the native peasantry of its land and livelihood, would in turn contribute greatly to the disintegration of the Empire. This posed the question: who benefited from Rome’s fabled world domination, if the Roman people themselves were damaged by it?
It is against this background that we have to investigate the reasons that moved Arminius to conceive and carry out his desperate undertaking. Arminius, the intelligent and well educated son of Germanic nobility, will have perceived with disdain, through the sharper and more critical eyes of a foreigner, what was the true basis and administrative reality for the much lauded Roman civilization with its gleaming palaces and temples, thermal baths and grandiose technical marvels.
At the beginning, Arminius too might well have admired all these things, until he became aware of the dark side of Roman civilization.
Like everyone accustomed to the hard life in the North with its long winters, cold wet climate, endless forests, moors and wooded hills, he would have been delighted with Italy when he first arrived there. He would have loved its abundant sunshine, wealth of cultural accomplishments, awe-inspiring buildings, roads and bridges, as well as the creative intelligence of its inhabitants. However, he soon realized that it was all built upon the bloody plundering and enslavement of half of Europe as well as large parts of North Africa and Eurasia. There can be no doubt that Arminius possessed the intelligence and discernment to perceive what lay beneath Rome’s grandiose and seductive surface and realize what was hidden behind the façade of the much vaunted pax romana.
Thus he will soon have realized that a few very rich families within the Roman nobility set the tone and ruled the population capriciously and arbitrarily. Their methods were simple but effective. They cultivated rhetoric and declamation and were very concerned with their dignity, making frequent sacrifices to the gods and supporting the arts. They paid great homage to their laws and appeared in gleaming white togas while leaving the dirty work to others: the military leaders, political operatives and overseers as well as swarms of spies, confidence men, extortionists, murderers and poisoners, all of whom were working to expand and augment their power and wealth.
After the Old Nobility came the moneyed nobility of the newly rich. These were criminal bloodsuckers who crushed profits from the bones of millions of slaves so that they could live the Doce Vita in their luxurous villas and landed estates, where they amused themselves with orgies, games, mistresses and “pleasure boys.”
No doubt Arminius soon discovered that his military superior Publius Qunictilius Varus was cut from this same cloth. The realization can only have strengthened his resolution.
Presumably he recognized the unmistakable signs and symptoms of decadence in other areas of Roman life as well. These symptoms included growing brutality and immorality, an overblown military apparatus and economic crisis combined with unbearable tax burden, which in turn resulted from the collapse of the peasantry and the great burden of the great masses of unemployed citizens living at public expense, who were more numerous that those who had to support them. In addition to these symptoms, the organs of the state had grown unable to maintain law and order, which resulted in civil wars. The armies of foreign-born slaves, who performed the vital work that was beneath the dignity of Roman citizens, mutinied from time to time. The state depended on mercenaries for the security of its borders and procurement of more slaves. Above all there were perpetual Roman military campaigns against “enemies,” meaning anyone who opposed Roman tyranny. These campaigns were merciless, with no quarter whatsoever. The “enemy” leaders would either be put to death or imprisoned for life in Roman-controlled territories, and the women and children either sold into slavery or resettled to suit Rome’s convenience.
Contemporary writers and historians have extensively described how Rome carried out its wars, deportations, expulsions, “ethnic cleansings” and “punitive expeditions.” As a Roman officer Arminius would have been particularly familiar with Caesar’s standard work De bello gallico, which was obligatory reading for all higher officers in the army.
It would have been perfectly clear to him that Caesar, the highly renowned field marshal, was responsible for the destruction of the Celtic civilization. He captured around 800 Celtic settlements and enslaved 300 Celtic tribes, killing over a million Celts and selling another million. Arminius was also aware that Caesar came to his despotic power through a career of bribery, intrigue and terror that was unique in the Roman world. He would have been familiar with the hypocritical “grounds for war” that Caesar used as pretexts for annihilating other civilizations. He would also have known the numbers involved in these “pacification actions,” as for example that Caesar killed around 80,000 of Suebi king Ariovist’s warriors and sold around 40,000 women and children. With the proceeds from slave sales, this “most cultured field marshal of his time” and “most famous son of Rome” fortified his military and political position and elevated himself to unexcelled grandeur. Arminius was of course also familiar with the tragedy of the great German prince Ariovist, who in the year 58 BC would have “made history” if he, instead of Caesar, had won the decisive battle for Gaul.
He would also have read about the 60,000 Nervier, of whom only around 500 survived as slaves, and about the 53,000 Atuatucans who were likewise enslaved and sold. Most of the proceeds from these sales made their way into Caesar’s private purse.
We can also assume that Arminius was aware of Caesar’s boast that his legions had killed 238,000 persons in his campaigns against the Helvetians. 92,000 of these were warriors. 146,000 were women, children and the elderly.
The accounts of Roman campaigns in a period of around a hundred years (called the “Roman genocides” and “wars for slaves and plunder”) are replete with such phrases as “flogged to death,” “decapitated,” “annihilated,” “slaughtered like animals,” “dragged away,” “executed,” “destroyed root and branch,” “cut down,” “liquidated,” “burned to the earth,” and “hands chopped off.”
The accounts are filled with text passages such as “The army slaughtered the enemy like animals, whose life or death depended only on his mercy or his anger” and “Then he had the entire land laid waste through murder, fire and plunder, so that the inhabitants were killed or captured.”
Other passages read “Then he ordered the hands chopped off of all those who had borne weapons, sparing their lives;” “No sex and no age could hope for mercy... whether subject to man or dedicated to the gods, everything was made level with the ground... They sated themselves until nightfall with the blood of their enemies... He sent out his riders to burn down every village and every farmstead that came into view and to slaughter the animals and carry away booty... Whatever food was not burned was destroyed by rain... Those who did not die by the sword, perished from hunger.”
Arminius would have been particularly impressed by the fate of Versingetorix, the youthful prince of the Gauls. After a heroic struggle for freedom he and 300,000 warriors were defeated by Caesar. Trusting the great Roman’s promises of clemency, he finally surrendered; then, after six years of imprisonment, he was dragged through Rome in chains as part of Caesar’s triumphal parade and then strangled on Caesar’s orders.
There can be no doubt that Arminius understood what was at stake. This collision of the profoundly incompatible worlds of Romans and Germans would inevitably confront his people with a threat to their very existence. Domination by the fasces and head-axes of the Roman lictors would change everyone’s life for the worse. It could only be their ruination, driving them into ever greater subjugation. The first signs of such domination had already become visible among certain families of the pro-Roman Germanic nobility: Blinded by the splendor of the Roman army, they were all too eager to accept bribes for political correctness and for acting as spies and informants on their countrymen.
Germania was still relatively free, but if it were entirely subjugated to Rome it would lose more that its heart and soul and Germanic values -- it would lose its existence as an independent people as well. Ultimately it would cease to be capable of developing its own national strength and character.
It would inevitably descend to the status of a colonized people ruled and dominated by foreign conquerors and condemned to paying eternal tribute, like the Gauls after their defeat.
What good would the advantages of the “Roman lifestyle” do them if everything that was sacred to the Germanic spirit should suddenly become invalid? What would become of the venerable and carefully cultivated virtues such as truthfulness, openness, reliability, fearlessness, moral purity, loyalty to kith and kin, respect for elders, and homage to women, Mother Nature and the gods of their forefathers?
Weren’t the most venerated Germanic tribes in imminent danger? If the Romans should overpower and destroy the Germanic tribes, wouldn’t that mean, in the eyes of the people, the vanquishment of their own gods and the beginning of permanent subjugation?
Under the new tyranny and after loss of the most sacred institution of all, freedom, wouldn’t all their values collapse and disintegrate? Wouldn’t the Roman vices take over Germania as they had taken over Rome – vices that were thoroughly despised even by Roman critics themselves?
Indolence, effeminacy, greed, money-obsession, cruelty, venality, moral decay: every crime and vice imaginable would spread like a plague and would inevitably lead to loss of the cultural identity of the people -- to its complete disintegration. While serving under Tiberius, Arminius had participated in several campaigns in Germania, along the Danube and in Pannonia (present day Hungary), where he had witnessed terrifying events. Even then, powerful moral considerations were already contributing to hardening of the decision that he had begun to formulate in secret.
Arminius was probably present on the bank of the Elbe when the fraternal Germanic tribes, once free like the Cheruskans, were forced to go down on their knees in subjugation to Tiberius.
He would have been present when entire families and clans were slaughtered in a murderous frenzy. He would have witnessed rape and plunder, arson and devastation of extensive areas of the countryside, including all the farms and settlements as well as wanton destruction of livestock, food and crops. He would have observed deportations of thousands of his Germanic countrymen and revolting massacres of young and old, mothers and children, as well as the rapes of young girls. He would have witnessed the transport of enslaved young Germanic men chained together in pairs on the way to the southern slave markets, whence they would be sold as galley slaves or else trained to fight in the gladiator casernes.
He would also have observed the revolting spectacle of oriental whoremongers bargaining for enslaved blonde “barbarian beauties” for use in the bordellos of legionnaire camps all over the Roman world. Here he might well have heard himself cursed in his own language by recently enslaved countrymen, which would have made a deep impression on him.
An awareness of the methods that Rome used to carry out its criminal policies of tyranny and conquest stayed with Arminius the Cheruskan everywhere he went. At some point he decided that he no longer wanted to be an accomplice to Roman crimes. The Cheruskans could suffer the same fate that had befallen all the other tribes and clans that had been forced under the Roman yoke!
These or similar realizations and considerations, thoughts and emotions stayed with Arminius and caused him to become Rome’s deadly enemy. Finally they led him to the decision to attack the Roman military at the first opportune moment that offered itself.
Of course other personal reasons which we will never know may have contributed to his decision. Years later, when in the course of the war with Germanicus his own wife and son were captured by the Romans, his anger, pain and unbending will drove him to ever stronger determination to ensure the freedom of his people.
Considering all the available evidence, we can summarize the principal reasons for Arminius’ disaffection from Rome as follows:
Soon after Varus appeared on the Rhine, Arminius must have made the final decision to fight for liberation, which he had been considering for some time. The political situation was very opportune, for several reasons:
Arminius believed that his time had now come. His undertaking could succeed only if two very important conditions existed:
First, he needed for the Romans to have full confidence in him. In the eyes of Supreme Commander Varus as well as his officers and officials, Arminius had to appear as an absolutely reliable member of the Roman Party who toed the line in every respect. In order to accomplish this, he needed to develop exquisite duplicity, which required near inhuman intelligence and self-control.
With masterful deceit und inventiveness he repeatedly feigned and engineered ever new “incidents” such as hints of social unrest here and there that could be calmed down only if Roman jurisdiction were imposed. He never failed to ostentatiously support Varus’ point of view that the thick-skulled German peasants were simply too stupid and primitive to appreciate the advantages of Roman culture and lifestyle, the “best law in the world” and “pacification” under Roman rule.
He would be especially flattering where juridical questions were concerned and report that Varus’s enlightened measures were beginning to take effect. He was always asking Varus for advice about how to best solve this or that vexing problem. Imagine how the “enlightened jurist” in Varus must have been taken in by Arminius’s flatteries and confidence-building ploy of inventing incidents and actions to reflect the glory of Varus! In addition, Arminius assisted the Roman governor with his knowledge of language and locales and familiarity with his people, until he finally made himself indispensable.
Arminius was ruthlessly probing and exploiting the weak points of his future enemy. Obviously, this apparently pro-Roman conduct by a Germanic prince was not without danger. Who among his countrymen could see through such a convincing mask of deceit and recognize the real Arminius the Freedom Fighter?
How they must have hated him as a willing stooge of Rome! They must have despised him all the more because he was one of them -- in fact, a member of their nobility! He could very easily have fallen victim to an assassin from the ranks of his own people. It is unlikely that anyone else could have carried out the task of liberation. Who else could have conducted a decisive battle such as that in the year 9 AD? Without Arminius, the most significant battle for all Germany might never have been fought.
The second prerequisite for success was that Arminius would have to succeed in organizing and leading several unruly tribes whose willingness to fight was purely voluntary. This was an undertaking of long duration, whose outcome was highly uncertain. How could he be sure that he could rely on these tribes that so often fought among themselves when it came to a show-down?
By their very nature, the ancient Germans resisted coercion. They were rugged individualists who resisted the very concept of military discipline. They never obeyed except voluntarily – but then they obeyed willingly and consistently, even at the cost of their lives.
Would Arminius be able to inspire the self-willed tribal chiefs to act in unison, and the individual warriors to stick together under all circumstances? How could he be sure that conduct of the battle would not be endangered by lack of discipline? In this battle he would not be commanding Roman legionnaires who were conditioned by hard discipline!
How could he be sure that his subordinates would not abandon all his strategic and tactical instructions because of rivalries or the frenzy of battle? His officers were impulsive and vainglorious warriors – anything but cool-headed officers experienced in a hundred battles, like the Roman centurions.
Another problem was timely communication over long distances and difficult terrain by means of smoke signals, mounted couriers and runners. Would his warriors stand firm if the Romans, after initial shock and surprise, quickly recovered, entered into formations and fought back, inflicting heavy losses on their attackers?
What would happen if a tribe suddenly lost enthusiasm, changed its mind and decided to go home?
Could he or anyone else actually command these poorly equipped and undisciplined men, who trusted only in their individual strength and courage, and lead them to attack a well equipped military machine of battle tested soldiers in a life-and-death struggle for survival? In the event of military setbacks, would he be able to inspire them to continue the struggle for months on end?
These and other imponderable considerations must have caused Arminius many sleepless nights.
He clearly trusted in the powerful influence he was able to exert on others. In addition, he must have had faith in the favor of the Germanic gods, who according to ancient belief granted their favorites not only noble descendance but the ability to inspire success and dispense good fortune to others as well.
There can be no doubt that Arminius possessed this ability! He obviously had great faith in himself or else he could not have summoned the unflinching courage to attempt the impossible. This required also the willingness to fail and accept all the consequences that failure entailed.
If, in addition, it was true that Prince Arminius was also the head conservator of the sacred religious objects of his realm, he would also have exerted powerful influence in this office.
The longer Varus ruled, the more resistance grew among the people. Even when they enjoyed Roman privileges, the nobility and possessing classes were concerned about their independence, loss of hereditary rights and social position. The peasantry, who had absolutely nothing good to expect from increasing Roman domination, complained ever more loudly, since they bore the main burden of increasing oppression.
The Germanic tribesmen, a barely literate people who still lived close to nature, had retained healthy distrust of foreign influences that threatened their way of life, and most of the population was opposed to imperialistic colonizers. Gaul, which had been thoroughly Romanized by Caesar, provided the Germans with a terrifying example of what could happen to them.
They hated Roman “justice” even more than they hated the weapons of the occupation forces. When the Roman lictors invaded the peaceful agricultural world of their settlements with their “just laws,” flogging rods and executioner’s axes, introducing oppression, cruel punishments and arrogant demeanor, the Germans instinctively clenched their fists.
The Romans could win no sympathy among the Germans for the blessings of “pacification” by fire and sword accompanied by plundering, enslavement and the brutal enforcement of Roman laws.
Thus it is safe to assume that Arminius was not alone in his opposition to Roman rule. As everywhere else in their empire, the Romans’ imperialistic occupation policies constantly called forth resentment and rebellion. Resistance was fermenting among a great many “liberated” and “pacified” peoples, who were in fact severely repressed. The fact that the land of the Cheruskans remained quiet for a long period was in fact attributable to the circumstance that the regions between Rhein and Weser were not yet subject to Roman occupation law. In other words, they were still far from being Romanized. The Roman military was found only in the armed camps where it even spent the winter – and this in itself was proof that the Romans felt secure there. Roman merchants who conducted business in Germanic lands were not only tolerated by the natives, they were made welcome, as is proven by frequent archaeological findings of Roman industrial products. There were numerous public markets in which the Germans conducted trade with foreign merchants.
“The Cheruskans were not restricted in their normal everyday activities. They continued with their customary activities and freedom-loving way of life, which was built on their prowess with weapons. If this process of gradual external adaptation and cautious internal assimilation had continued, they would not have felt threatened or restricted. Perhaps, without noticing it, they would have changed their perceptions and attitudes.”
This is how the Roman author Cassios Dio* described the situation.
This was an indirect criticism of Varus’ disastrous policies.
What he, of course, does not say is that such reeducation would ultimately have meant the end of German identity and freedom. Their fate would have been the same as that of the Gauls -- a “Colonia Germania” or colony of slaves.
We cannot know whether Arminius, who was intimately familiar with Roman methods of conquest, anticipated that such methods would ultimately be disastrous for his homeland. As we have seen, there are cogent reasons to believe this. It could be that it was not until the imposition of Varus’s draconian methods of repression and exploitation that he became a freedom fighter and deadly enemy of Rome. At any rate he was supported in his opposition to Roman rule by those who, for whatever reason, perceived the foreigners to be hated invaders of whom they wanted to be rid, and against whom they angrily rebelled.
It was he who, acting alone, was able to fan the glowing coals of resentment beneath the surface into a bright and open flame. It is indicative of his exceptional political intuition that from the beginning he based armed resistance upon a precise military plan. In order for this plan to succeed, many factors would have to work together and, after painstaking preparation, the plan would have to be put into effect at precisely the right time -- the only moment possible. There was no alternative plan.
Arminius’ plan could not be carried out with the support of the Cheruskans alone. In view of the huge enemy force, the Germans would have to have approximately the same size army at the critical moment, in order for the plan to have any chance of success, It was not until the fall of the year 7, until year 8 and the winter of year 8-9 that Arminius had time to seek reliable allies. On the eastern bank of the Rhine, he must have approached the Marser, Chatten, Brukterer, Tenkterer and Usipeter tribes as well as the Tubanten, Angrivarier and Ampsivarier. Above all it was the Markomanns, further to the southeast, whose assistance was needed to play the role of the second militarily key force in the resistance against Rome. The Markommans’ powerful king Marbod had been attempting to free his people of Roman domination for years. However, Marbod refused to assist Arminius, apparently suspecting that he really was allied with Rome.
We do not know all the tribes that joined in Arminius’ confederation. Presumably they were those who were already burdened by Roman rule and had suffered the most torture, burnings, rape and every kind of cruelty. These were primarily the tribes between the Rhine, Ems and Weser. In addition to the Cheruskans, they were the Brukterers, Marsers, and Ampsivariers as well as the remnants of the Umsipeter, Sugambrer and Chatten.
It was anything but an invincible confederation that came about. The German fighters, a kind of landsturm or peasant horde, were skilled with lance, sling and sword, but they could not remotely be compared with the professional army of the Roman Empire. Among the Romans, everything down to the tiniest detail was specified and standardized according to “war regulations.” Their constantly trained, highly disciplined legionnaires were battle tested. Their foot soldiers were supported by battalions of archers as well as light and heavy ballistas or catapults. A direct attack on the closely formed battle formation of a Roman legion, in which whole batallions on a given signal could maneuver as one man, was as pointless as an assault on a fortified legion camp with its stone walls, moats, palisades and defensive archers.
The Germans’ disadvantage could be overcome only by tactics in which the Germans were skilled, and which were superior to the Roman advantages. That was a type of warfare that we call guerilla war today.*
Footnote: Guerilla warfare is not to be confused with partisan warfare such as that of the Franctireurs in 1870 or the Yugoslav, Soviet and Italian partisans during the Second World War. Partisan fighters are small, irregular terrorist groups, usually operating in the rear of the enemy, who use hit-and-run tactics and are not identifiable. Occasionally, parts of the German population also used partisan tactics during World War II.
If Arminius, who was clearly the weaker, wanted to confront his overwhelmingly larger opponent on anything approaching equal footing, and hope for a decisive victory, he had to use every conceivable trick of deception, cover, and camouflage. He would also have to take advantage of whatever opportunities the terrain offered. Under no circumstances would a partial or incomplete victory suffice. The entire undertaking, which was highly risky in every respect, would most certainly have failed with catastrophic consequences unless victory were complete and overwhelming.
A particularly difficult part of his plan was to delay setting all the other parts in motion until the actual attack. This was because tactical details of the attack could be established only when the exact march route from the Weser camp was known.
Armin surely discussed every possible battle plan and every conceivable exigency in secret meetings with the other tribal chiefs, after requiring them to swear oaths of loyalty. This was especially true of plans concerning exact locations and timing. They would have evaluated the areas to determine which were best suited for ambush on account of their accessibility and tactical suitability.
Along the route that Varus would most probably take were heights, valleys, ravines, swamp passages, or bodies of water where natural ambuscades, entrenchments, impediments and route obstructions were possible. Where would be the best place for a central command post for conducting the battle? Where could weapons be secretly stored? Where could staging posts be established in nearby regrouping areas?
In addition, Arminius had to establish appropriate methods of communication between the confederates. He had to designate secret messengers who were familiar with the territory and devise methods to protect the confederates against traitors. By the time hostilities began, Arminius would have to know the Germans’ approach routes, distances and march times. He had to make sure that every able bodied-man from remote settlements and isolated farmsteads was informed in time to meet at their appointed assembly stations.
It is proof of his outstanding organization and discipline that all these plans and preparations were actually accomplished. Despite varying distances, detours around Roman posts and crossing primeval forests, moors, streams and mountain heights, a total of 15 to 20 thousand men were able to assemble in the vicinity of the battle. Arminius’s own auxiliary troops made up his most reliable group of fighters. Their training approached that of the legionaires, although they were more lightly armed.
It would of course be very interesting to know the number of troops at Arminius’ disposal, which is difficult to determine. The precise population numbers and density of settlement of the various tribes are not known and can only be roughly determined on the basis of burying grounds and density of archeological artifacts. The approximate strength of a medium sized Germanic tribe ranged from 25,000 to 50,000 persons, while the average number of warriors would have been 5,000 to 10,000 at most. If we assume the participation of three or four tribal groupings, we arrive at a total strength of around 20 to 25 thousand able-bodied men. At any rate, the Germanic military force was a great deal weaker in training and equipment, if not in numbers, than the Roman force stationed in the land, including their numerous auxiliary troops.
The plan Arminius presented to the assembled tribal leaders might have sounded simple, but its successful execution depended on every individual part being carried out smoothly and precisely.
The moment was favorable, since most of the Roman legions were still occupied in Pannonien. The most favorable time for an attack would be while Varus was leading his three legions to winter quarters in Cologne and Xanten. During this march Arminius intended, by means of a feigned uprising, to lure the army from the safe and secure main road. Then he would lead them into the forests and ravines of the local mountains or else into a narrow passage through the moors. The marching columns and supply trains would be forced to regroup on rough terrain from the most secure Agmen quatratum formations (described on next page) into Agmen expeditum formations of narrow columns. The long extended cohorts would then be unable to either dodge their attackers or regroup into fighting formations. At that time the Germans would split up the long snake of the Roman army and annihilate it from protected ambush. In order to avoid the possibility of individual units escaping, the narrows and passes had to be effectively blocked and sealed. At this moment, the Germans would have to be present and prepared at designated gathering places. Arminius and his auxiliaries would give the signal for the general assault and the individual fighting bands would then operate in their designated areas.
Arminius would have to make the indispensable conditions for victory very clear to this small trusted group of conspirators. There had to be a single sudden, relentless battle of annihilation, and the attack must come as a complete surprise. Breaking up into individual actions without completely annihilating the enemy had to be avoided at all costs. Such a dispersal would certainly be avenged with a military invasion that would be more brutal than anything seen before. The conspirators’ main problem was how to make preparations for the attack without arousing Varus’ suspicion. Even with the greatest secrecy imaginable, the gatherings of the Germanic troops would surely be noticed, especially just before the attack. It was not possible to maintain absolute secrecy, since the Roman military would have been informed by their spies and by Roman merchants who were familiar with the area. Furthermore they had to reckon with traitors and collaborators within their midst.
Arminius must have succeeded in convincing the leaders of the confederacy that success depended on completely deceiving the Romans about preparations for the attack until it actually began.
No one knew about the plan except the princes of the tribes, who were sworn to absolute secrecy. Furthermore the gatherings of the warriors had to be so well disguised that it would not be recognized as preparation for an attack.
This was best accomplished if the whole operation could be presented as part of a larger military undertaking approved by Varus -- under the very eyes of the governor! This had the great advantage that troop movements would not arouse suspicion if it was known that German auxiliaries were assisting in repressing the rebellion or rebellions. Their extent could easily be disguised by dividing them into small, separate marching groups. The great mass of German soldiers, including their lower ranking officers, were not informed about their real destination until the last minute.
Until then, the warriors did not need to know their real mission. The assembly area was most likely the sacred grove of Teutoburg, which was familiar to all. The Teutoburg, so named by Tacitus in his TEUTOBURGIENSIS SALTUS, was presumably the fortified site of a cult society composed of members of the bordering Cherusker, Brukterer, Marser and perhaps Chatten tribes. It lay in the middle of a great forested area, and its members would congregate there at certain seasonal festivals such as their thanksgiving feast in the fall. Tacitus writes that the festivals were peaceful congregations, although the tribesmen remained armed at all times. In general, Rome tolerated the religious customs of subjected or allied nations, as Cassius Dio explained on page 56:49 of his history of Rome. The locale that Tacitus called Teutoburgiensis is not well described topographically or geographically, but it was most likely the Externsteine, the sacred grove of ash trees and rock pillars near Detmold, as location of a sacred Germanic cult shrine.
In addition, the location of the Externsteine grove near the most probable march route of the Varus legions makes it particularly likely as the assembly area of Arminius’ forces.
Arminius would have had timely notice of the approximate date on which Varus would leave his camp on the Weser, as well as his anticipated march route to the fortress on the Rhine. In any event the march to the Rhine would have to occur before the onset of winter, sometime between mid-September and mid-October.
This would have been the most favorable time to attack, since the harvest would have been completed by then and the Cheruskan Heerbann (main body of soldiery) would be completely available, as would those of their confederates. In addition, food rations would be assured. All military preparations such as armament and preparation of ambushes should have been completed by then.
During all this time, Arminius had to maintain his dangerous double game of deceit. Only a man with nerves of steel, incredible cool-headedness and surpassing intelligence would have been able to keep a firm grip on all the imponderables, unanticipated exigencies and conspiratorial threads while continuing to organize a decisive military battle.
In Arminius’ reckoning there was still an additional, very dangerous weak point.
The attack could succeed only if the extended Roman army was so distant from its point of departure that a return march was no longer possible and also distant enough from the nearest permanent camp that it would be unable to reach it. Above all, the attack could succeed only in such difficult terrain that the legions would not be able to assemble in their indomitable battle formations. Here again Arminius made proper and timely preparations. Even before Varus started out, Arminius feigned or directed an alleged “rebellion of distant tribes” through the use of false rumors and phony messengers.
We do not know which tribes were the subjects of the rumors. However, the alleged uprising was presented to Varus as being so dangerous that he decided to suppress it during the course of his return march as a demonstration of the power and might of the Empire. He probably thought that the mere appearance of such a great force, combined with rough intercession by a few cohorts, would suffice to quickly control the situation and intimidate the unruly population. However, this meant that he would have to leave the safe and secure east-west route for rough and unfamiliar pathways through the region of the “rebels.” He was marching precisely into the area where Arminius wanted him -- where the lightly armed Germanic troops would have the advantage over the awkward, heavily laden legionaires with their large number of supply wagons and long train of camp followers.
Perhaps Arminius persuaded Varus to send a reconnaissance unit to the alleged rebellious district in order to strengthen him in his decision. This unit either never returned or else encountered “rebels” with considerable losses, and so gave convincing eyewitness reports of actual unrest. At any rate, Varus’s main army was weakened by being extended and made vulnerable in rough terrain, even before the real battle began.
By being tricked into changing his march route, Varus fell into the trap set by Arminius, which would mean the death of him and his legions. This key initial success in deception would also create the best precondition for the solution of the greatest problem Arminius faced: the temporal and geographic consolidation of his confederates in the face of suppression of the alleged “rebels!”
If both deceptions succeeded as planned, then even before the battle, he would already have a decisive double advantage to assure victory: the appearance of armed German troops in the vicinity of Teutoburg would be seen as an entirely normal and credible arrival of Cheruskan auxiliary troops in support of Varus’ punitive expedition.
The Romans had already been in Cheruskan territory for at least 13 years and were accustomed to seeing Cheruskan auxiliaries carrying out guard duty and war expeditions into other tribal areas. Thus the Romans saw no cause for concern, which was a great boon for Arminius. Now the assembling fighting groups needed only be informed by their leaders about the revolt against Rome, directed to their stations, and wait in their camouflaged positions for the Romans.
In addition, the Romans had long observed the very great significance of the Teutoburg for the Germans as a sacred autonomous area. Varus himself, who had no interest in unnecessarily provoking unrest among his Germanic subjects, had (perhaps at the suggestion of Arminius) forbidden his subordinates to enter this region under penalty of punishment.*
Footnote: * VELLEIUS PATERCULUS, Historia Romana, II/119,2]
It is easy to imagine that the cunning Arminius unscrupulously exploited the Romans’ tolerance of the religious practices of subject peoples in his planning. This meant that he could legally and openly arrange a converging of large groups of Germanic warriors under cover of a “cult festival” in the sacred forest of the gods, which corresponded exactly to the time of the legions’ march.
The greatest danger to the conspiracy, premature revelation actually occurred at the last moment on the very eve of the army’s return march to its winter quarters on the Rhine. As has happened so often in the history of nations, the revelation was made through treachery -- through none other than Arminius’ father-in-law, the fanatically pro-Roman Segestes.
Segestes had seen through the game of his hated son-in-law and wanted to expose and destroy him. During their last meal together, he reported to Varus everything he knew or suspected about the planned attack.
Varus disregards Segestes’ warning and tries to placate him - a consequential moment for the Roman field marshal!
Segestes’ hatred for his son-in-law was probably well known and quite probably the source of jokes.
In order to lend emphasis and credibility to his sworn allegations, he stressed his sobriquet “Friend of Rome” and urged Varus to arrest him along with Arminius and hold them both in irons. Without their leader, the people would be unable to act, and he, Varus, could then determine who was guilty and who innocent. According to the accounts handed down to us, the Roman thanked Segestes for his warning but did not take the matter seriously. We can only guess as to why he took no action. Perhaps it was because he disliked the conceited and pig-headed giant Segestes and liked the urbane and Romanized Arminius. Perhaps Arminius himself had given Varus a detailed account about the “abduction” of Thusnelda and her father’s uncompromising hatred. Probably it all seemed to Varus as nothing more than a family feud.
One of the most momentous decisions of world history occurred at this moment, when a noose could easily have been slipped around Arminius’ neck and the entire rebellion was hanging by a thread! A single word from Varus -- the word “Guard!” -- would have been enough to frustrate the liberation of Germania, perhaps forever. This order was not given, however. In the history of the world, great events have often depended on such “trivialities” as this.
After such a warning by Segestes we would have expected that Varus the judge would not simply brush such a charge off the table, even if they were directed against his most trusted associate. We would expect him to question the two guests at his table and to look into the matter. Obviously Arminius still felt confident that he possessed Varus’ full trust – still felt confident that the latter would undertake no measures against him. At any rate, Varus certainly trusted him more than he trusted Segestes. Varus most certainly knew that the two hated and avoided each other.
In the words of Cassius Dio (54/1819): “Arminius and Segimer were constantly with Varus and often ate at his table.” For this reason he was in a good mood and suspected nothing bad.”
Valleius Paterculus wrote (II, 117): “He lived in the delusion that the inhabitants of the land (Germania) were humanlike creatures that had no real human attributes except human language and body parts. He believed that by means of the law, he could get the better of those he could not subdue with the sword.”
He was thoroughly familiar with the jealousies, envies, aversions and perpetual conflicts that existed between the Germanic nobles. He found them quite normal. He made good use of their discord in applying the principle of divide et impera (divide and rule) in order to further his own interests and play one adversary against the other. He would have observed with interest the controlled calm of young Arminius as contrasted with the helpless raging anger of the old man, and calculated how he might exploit it. It has been reported that he strongly reproached Segestes for having become so upset for no reason and for slandering and defaming Arminius. Be that as it may, Arminius must have succeeded in deflecting all suspicion from himself with his calm conduct.
Varus had known Arminius for more than two years. He knew that the latter since early youth had been raised as a Roman. Arminius’ parents and closest relatives were all friends of his friend Tiberius. He was a Roman officer and knight who, like his brother Flavus, had been cited for bravery in several military campaigns. His brother-in-law Segimundus occupied a high ranking priestly office in Cologne. Furthermore, Arminius’ reliability had proven him to be on countless occasions one of Varus’ most competent staff members. As far as Varus was concerned, Arminius was beyond reproach. The season was advancing and it was high time to get the march under way.
Arminius stayed until the table was cleared, drank to the health of the Field Marshall and took his leave. Could it be that they both drank from the fabulous goblet that belonged to the silver service for which Varus was famous? And for good measure, did Arminius offer the customary Roman toast “Bibe multos annos!” (may you drink from it for many years)?
And where was Segestes? He must have retired to his fortress, furious and exasperated. He could not fight on the Roman side because he dared not oppose the widespread anti-Roman sentiments of his people. Tacitus reports that Arminius later had him arrested as protection from his father-in-law’s assaults.